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LOCKED IN INEQUALITY:
THE PERSISTENCE OF DISCRIMINATIONt
Daria Roithmayr*
In this Article, I argue that the practice of charging school fees to attend public school
is an example of locked-in discrimination that persists over time, even in the absence
of intentional discrimination. Exploring the lock-in model of discrimination in the
unique context of South Africa, I make two central points. First, discriminatory
practices often become locked into institutional structures because high switching
costs-the costs of moving fiom a discriminatory practice to an inclusive one--make
it too difficult for an institution to discontinue discriminating. Even when
institutional actors are filly committed to eradicating racial disparity, they may be
constrained from doing so by high switching costs. Second, contemporary anti-
discrimination law in the U.S. may be particularly ill equipped to deal with locked-
in discrimination. U.S. equal protection jurisprudence only prohibits discrimination
that can be traced to an individual or group of individuals who intend to
discriminate, and does not address locked-in discrimination that persists even after
institutional actors no longer intend to discriminate.
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INTRODUCTION
Unlike most national constitutions, the South African constitution
guarantees both an affirmative right to basic education and the right to
equality under the law.' Despite these constitutional guarantees,
however, the South African government disproportionately excludes
poor Black learners from attending public school, by charging private
tuition or "user fees." 2 Nearly all public schools charge fees, and fifteen
percent of schools charge more than 500 Rand ("R500") per year.3
Indeed, many of the historically White schools, located in the wealthiest
communities, charge as much as R10,000 per year, far beyond the means
of all but the most well-to-do families. Predictably, the user fee system in
South Africa reproduces much of the racial and class inequality in access
to education that marked the apartheid era, despite a statutory exemption
process designed to provide access for the poor.4 Why would the new,
Black-majority government continue to charge user fees for education,
when doing so reproduces the very racial disparities that the new
government sought to eradicate? In this Article, I argue that the South
African government has retained the practice of charging school fees
because it does not want to pay the prohibitive switching costs associated
with a more egalitarian funding policy. More generally, I argue that the
practice of charging private fees to finance South African public
1. S. AFR. CONST. ch. II, § 29; S. AFi. CONST. ch. II, § 9. Section 29 of the South
African constitution guarantees to all people "the right to a basic education, including
adult basic education." Id. Section 9 of the constitution guarantees a right to equality
before the law. Id.
2. For a general discussion by South African scholars about the practice of charg-
ing user fees, see Salim Vally &Yolesa Dalamba, Racism, 'Racial Integration' and Desegregation
in South African Public Secondary Schools, in S. Ans. HUMANs RIGHTS COMMISSION COMBINED
REPORT 47 (1999).
3. See S. AFR. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ANNUAL REPORT (1999). At exchange
rates in August 2002, approximately 10 South African rand to the dollar, 500 rand equals
approximately 50 dollars.
4. See infra Part III (discussing the income-based exemption scheme created by
national statute). For a more doctrinal discussion about racial and class inequalities pro-
duced by school fees in South Africa, and possible constitutional challenges to the practice
of charging fees, see Daria Roithmayr, The Constitutionality of User Fees in South Afican
Public Education, 19 S. AFR.J. HUM. RTS. (forthcoming 2003).
[VOL. 9:31
Locked in Inequality
education constitutes an example of the "market lock-in" model of
discrimination. The market lock-in model, which I have developed in
earlier work, draws from recent work in antitrust and economic theory
on the durability of monopolies.' Lock-in literature argues that, even in
the absence of continuing anticompetitive behavior, market monopolies
can persist over long periods of time and eventually become "locked" in
place.6
For example, scholars have used the lock-in model to explain how
Microsoft's early advantage in computer operating systems became self-
reinforcing over time.7 In the operating systems market, institutional
links between software authors and operating systems permitted
Microsoft's early monopoly advantage to reproduce itself Software
authors, who wanted the biggest market for their products, increasingly
wrote programs specifically for Windows®, the more popular operating
system. In turn, consumers, who wanted the widest choice of software,
increasingly purchased Windows® as their operating system of choice.
More authors produced more Microsoft-specific software, thereby
producing even more consumers, and so on. Microsoft's early lead grew
exponentially, without the need for further innovation or unfair
conduct, and Windows'® dominance in the operating systems market
eventually became locked in.8
Just as Microsoft's early advantage has become locked into the mar-
ket, the market lock-in model of discrimination argues that a racial
group's early monopoly advantage can become self-reinforcing and ulti-
mately locked in, particularly when the racial monopoly operates for a
long time. More specifically, the lock-in model argues that in the U.S.,
as in other countries, Whites monopolized access to jobs, housing, edu-
cation, and wealth, in a racial monopoly that lasted for over three
hundred years. The lock-in model suggests that this White monopoly
advantage may have become self-reinforcing and perhaps locked in.
5. See Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-in Model of Discrimination,
86 VA. L. REV. 727 (2000) [hereinafter Barriers to Entry].
6. See id. at 742-53. The market lock-in model draws from a range of lock-in
literature that covers various concepts, including de facto standards, increasing returns, and
network externalities. See, e.g., W BRIAN. ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPEND-
ENCE IN THE ECONOMY (1994); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 7-8 (1990);W Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns and the New
World of Business, 74 HAmv. Bus. REV. 100 (1996); Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell,
Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in Standardization, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 117, 118
(1994); Nicholas Economides, The Economnics of Networks, 14 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 673, 694
(1996); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibil-
ity, 75 Am. ECON. REV. 424 (1985); Mark Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Inplications of
Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv. 479, 488-99 (1998).
7. ARTHUR, supra note 6, at 102.
8. Id.
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This Article explores further implications of the market lock-in
model in a wholly different context: public education financing in post-
apartheid South Africa. South Africa appears to be a particularly compel-
ling place to explore the contours of the market lock-in model of
discrimination for two reasons. First, the transition out of apartheid is
relatively recent; the country's first democratic elections were held in
1994. 9 Given that timing, it may be much easier to trace discriminatory
practices to their apartheid-based roots in order to determine whether
path dependence plays a role in continuing discrimination. By compari-
son, it is more difficult to link current practices to earlier historical
practices of racial exclusion here in the U.S. because "transition" oc-
curred more than forty years ago."5
In addition, intentional discrimination is less likely to explain
persistent inequality. Given that the Black-majority African National
Congress ("ANC") has controlled the South African government since
1994, intent by the government to discriminate is less likely to be a
motive behind any decision to retain an apartheid era practice." Thus, it
might be easier to link discriminatory practices to structural forces of
market lock-in.'
2
9. In parliamentary style elections, the African National Congress ("ANC") was
elected to power, although initially it was required to share power with other parties in a
"government of national unity." See Jenni Karlsson et al., A Critical Examination of the De-
velopment of School Governance Policy and Its Implications for Achieving Equity, in THE STATE,
EDUCATION AND EQUITY IN POsT-APARTHEID SouTH AFRIA 139 (E. Motala & J. Pampallis
eds., 1999) [hereinafter School Governance Policy]. In the more recent 1999 elections, the
ANC retained power in all branches of elected government except in one province,
where the Inkatha Freedom Party retained a stronghold. After that election, the "new"
National Party formed an alliance with the Democratic Party to exclude the ANC in the
Western Cape. See Susan Daley, Mandela Turns Over South African Presidency, CHIC. TiB.,
June 15, 1999, at 4; Dean E. Murphy Anger Boils in Province After Coalition Excludes Tle
ANC, L.A.TIMES,July 3, 1999, at A2.
10. At the same time, the shorter amount of time may make a less compelling case
for lock-in. To pronounce an institutional process to be locked-in after only eight years
may be a bit premature. I thank Professor Michelle Adams for this insight. Telephone in-
terview with Michelle Adams (May 13, 2003).
11. In spite of the party's success, however, increasing numbers of South Africans are
becoming disaffected with the ANC. See Tom Nevin, Mbeki Grows Bigger Than ANC,
AFRICAN BusiNEss, Feb. 1,2003, at 44.
12. In South Africa, as in most places with a history of legally enforced segregation,
class significantly correlates with race. The correlation, of course, is not perfect. It is im-
portant to note, for example, that many historically White, former Model C schools
currently enroll significant numbers of Black learners, who come from a relatively small
but growing Black middle class. Nevertheless, it is possible to discuss race and class to-
gether as the locus of discrimination in public education. Indeed, a recent study
conducted on school financing in the Eastern and Western Capes demonstrates the ex-
tremely strong correlation between the racial composition of a school, the poverty of the
surrounding community, and the amount of fees collected by a school governing body. See
Edward B. Fiske & Helen E Ladd, Financing Schools in Post-Apartheid South Africa:
[VOL. 9:31
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In this Article, I use the South African school fee system to develop
two central arguments about locked-in discrimination. First, I develop
more fully the idea that racist practices can become locked into institu-
tional structures because switching costs make it too costly to adopt a less
discriminatory set of practices. Second, I argue that U.S. constitutional
jurisprudence fails to address locked-in discrimination because the Equal
Protection Clause only focuses on intentional discrimination and not on
institutional discrimination.
The first argument about switching costs proceeds largely as an em-
pirical description of South African politics. In particular, I argue that the
new South African government has chosen to retain user fees in public
education, not because it intends to discriminate, but because the gov-
ernment would find it too costly to fund public education without
relying on such fees. 3
The history of the user fee system, and its path dependence, is cen-
tral to understanding the switching costs argument. The apartheid regime
under the National Party ("NP") at the end of the 1980s originally
adopted user fees in education as part of its effort to retain White control
over White public education even after transformation. More specifi-
cally, the NP adopted school fees as part of a broader unilateral shift from
national control over education to local control." Research confirms that
at the end of apartheid, many of the so-called model C schools (histori-
cally White schools) charged fees that completely excluded Black
learners. In 1993, the average Model C primary school charged R1100
and the average secondary school charged R1600.16 Thus, fees for one
child cost an average Black family more than fourteen percent of its in-
come, but only 3.5% of an average White family income." It is not
surprising that after 1994, the new democratic government immediately
did away with formal Black enrollment limitations in public schools. 8
Public schools were prohibited from imposing any limitation whatsoever
on the number of Black students who could attend a particular school. 9
Initial Steps Towards Fiscal Equity (June 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) [hereinafter Financing Schools].
13. See infra Part IVA.1 (discussing switching costs).
14. See infra Part II (describing the decision by NP Minister of Education, Piet
Clase, to adopt the Model C school format, which depends heavily on parent-supplied
school fees).
15. See id.
16. See id.; see also Leon Tikly & Thabo Mabogoane, Marketisation as a Strategy for




19. See infra Part II (describing the lifting of racial restrictions and repeal of all seg-
regation laws relating to education).
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Given the racist history of the user fee system and its impact on
poor Black learners, however, it is remarkable that the user fee system
remains very much in place today, nine years after the transformation
from apartheid. It is even more surprising to learn that the ANC, after
studying the problem at length, deliberately adopted a school financing
mechanism that relied heavily on user fees.2"
This Article argues that the ANC government chose to retain the
user fee system because prospective switching costs made any move to a
more redistributive system potentially too costly.2' A switch to a system
that did not rely on user fees inevitably would have produced one of two
types of switching costs-either massive increased spending for public
education or White flight from public schools. Initially, in the absence of
user fees, a move to equalize funding levels upwards to the level of
White schools would have required the government to increase its edu-
cation budget significantly.22 Indeed, available evidence indicates that the
government would have had to expend a significantly greater portion of
the domestic budget on education. Given the country's recently adopted
emphasis on fiscal austerity, however, any increase in the education
budget would have had significant political and economic repercussions
for the new government.23
Alternatively, in the absence of user fees, a move to equalize
downward to the level of non-White schools would have risked White
flight from public schools.24 In turn, any such exodus of middle and
high-income "opinion-makers" and "decision-makers" might have trig-
gered further reductions in spending, and endangered the overall health
of public education.25 In light of the unacceptably high switching costs
associated with either choice, the new government opted instead to re-
tain the user-fee system, despite the ANC's intent to eradicate the racial
stratification that characterized apartheid.26
The second argument in this Article is less descriptive and more
normative, in that it criticizes the effectiveness of U.S. anti-
discrimination law. In particular, I argue that U.S. law does not address
locked-in discrimination because the U.S. Equal Protection Clause does
20. See infra Part IVA.1 (describing the decision by the Minister of Education and
Parliament to retain the user-fee features of the Model C school in new school financing
legislation).
21. See infra Part IV (detailing the argument on switching costs and describing the
operation of positive feedback loops).
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. (describing the prospective loss of funding per learner for students at
former Model C schools in the absence of a government decision to budget more na-





not invalidate discrimination that is not intentional. Under Washington v.
Davis,27 the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Equal Protection
Clause does not address discrimination other than that which can be
traced to individual or institutional intent to discriminate.2 Because
locked-in discrimination occurs at the institutional and not individual
level, U.S. constitutional law cannot remedy this type of inequality. In
contrast, South African constitutional law permits plaintiffs to challenge
government action that was not intended to discriminate, but which has
the effect of creating racial disparity. 29 Thus, the South African Equality
Clause may be far more effective at dismantling the legacy of apartheid
than the U.S. Equal Protection Clause is at eradicating the legacy of Jim
Crow."
The following sections develop these arguments in the context of
user fees. In Part I, I outline the basic elements of the market lock-in
model, with a particular emphasis on switching costs, positive feedback,
and path dependence. In Part II, I sketch the outlines of the user fee sys-
tem in its current form and highlight the key provisions from the South
African Schools Act and the administrative regulations from the South
African Department of Education. In this section, I also review the his-
tory of the user fee system, tracing its roots to the end of apartheid, when
the NP attempted to retain White control over education funding. In
Part III, I describe the current racial and class inequalities that character-
ize public education at the primary and secondary levels in South Africa.
Here, I link those inequalities to disparities in funding created by the user
fee system.
In Part IV, I argue that the user fee system and its accompanying
inequalities now have become locked into the structure of public
education because switching costs make any non-user fee system too
difficult to adopt. I also argue here that switching costs have become self-
reinforcing over time because of the relationship between funding and
the presence of middle and high-income families in the system. In
addition, I explore potential remedies for locked-in discrimination in
South African public education financing. In particular, I propose a
partial ceiling on user fees, wherein the government continues to permit
user fees and private contributions, but redistributes a portion of the
resources received above a certain threshold to historically disadvantaged
schools. In Part V, I conclude by examining the implications of the lock-
in model of discrimination for anti-discrimination law. In this section, I
compare the U.S. legal model, which focuses on discrimination as an
intentional phenomenon, with the South African model, which focuses
27. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
28. See infra PartV.A (discussing Washington v. Davis in detail).
29. See id.
30. See id. (analyzing school fees under the South African constitution).
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both on intent and effects. I conclude by arguing that U.S. constitutional
law cannot effectively address locked-in discrimination because it
requires that discrimination be intentional.
I. THE MARKET LoCK-IN MODEL OF
DISCRIMINATION: A PRIMER
In previous work, I have sketched out the market lock-in model of
discrimination. The model suggests that discrimination persists because
segregation-era discriminatory practices have become structurally locked
into institutional processes.3 It will be useful to rehearse those elements
of the lock-in model that have relevance here.
The market lock-in model of discrimination draws heavily from re-
cent work in economics, antitrust theory, and complex systems theory.32
This literature argues that market monopolies can become self-reinforcing,
locked in, and ultimated under certain circumstances. For example, in
markets characterized by positive feedback, an early competitive advantage
can feed on itself to produce a perpetually increasing lead that ultimately
becomes impossible to overcome. To illustrate, search engines typically
rank websites on the basis of how popular they are with consumers, in
this case, by measuring how often a particular document is cited by other
web pages.33 In the website market, a small advantage over other com-
petitors may become automatically self-reinforcing because citations on
other web pages will produce a higher search engine ranking, and a
higher search engine ranking in turn will produce more citations on
other web pages. Thus, the website's advantage can progressively rein-
force itself without any further improvements or innovations." Over
time, the more popular web page accrues such a commanding lead that
competitors cannot catch up. When that occurs, we say that the product
has become "locked-in" to its monopoly or market leader position.
The market might also become locked-in because of high switching
costs-the costs of switching from the incumbent's product to a com-
petitor's product. Lock-in can occur when switching costs can become
too high to permit consumers to move away from the incumbent's
product and toward a competitor's product, even when the latter is more
31. See generally Barriers to Entry, supra note 5.
32. See id. at 732, 742.
33. See Sergey Brin & Lawrence Page Official Webpage, The Anatomy of A Large-
Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine, at http://www7.scu.edu.au/programme/fullpapers/
1921/com1921.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2003) (describing the algorithm used to obtain
the function "Page Rank," which is derived in part from the number of citations to a
document on other web pages).
34. See Barriers to Entry, supra note 5, at 743 (describing the positive feedback loops
created by increasing returns).
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innovative. 3 When consumers switch from a VCR to a DVD player, for
example, they must pay the cost to buy the new player. Because the
VCP, and DVD are both "network" products, however, consumers must
also pay two additional switching costs: the cost to recreate their video
library in DVD format and the cost of losing access to a network of
video suppliers, such as friends, family, or video stores, if other users have
not yet made the switch. Such additional switching costs may lock in
consumers to a product even when alternative technology is more desir-
able.
Markets characterized by switching costs and self-reinforcing posi-
tive feedback also frequently exhibit a characteristic called "path
dependence."36 In path-dependent markets, historical events that occur
early in the formation of the industry can have a significant effect on
market outcomes.37 For example, in the context of software develop-
ment, the first competitor to bring a particular innovation in software to
the market (the so-called "first mover") frequently develops a significant
advantage, like being the first to set the industry standard that will link
other users to each other.3" This advantage might become self-reinforcing
if customers choose the product for the increasingly large number of
network users-each new customer makes the product progressively
more valuable.39 Accordingly, a market competitor might achieve a mo-
nopoly or near-monopoly position because the competitor was the first
mover. This is true even when the market competitor has not engaged in
predatory behavior.4"
Building from the concept of a locked-in market monopoly, I have
developed the lock-in model of discrimination to explain why White
35. See id. at 747 (citing A. Douglas Melamed, Network Industries and Antitrust, 23
HAR.J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 147, 150 (1999)) (describing switching costs).
36. See Barriers to Entry, supra note 5, at 742. With reference to the notion of path
dependence, see Paul A. David, Understanding the Economics of QWERTY the Necessity of
History, in ECONOMic HISTORY AND THE MODERN ECONOMIST 30 (William N. Parker ed.,
1986); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In and History, 11 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109
HAov. L. REv. 641,643-52 (1996).
37. See Barriers to Entry, supra note 5, at 742 (citing S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E.
Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-in and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995)).
38. See Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover Advantages, 9
STRAT. MGMT. J. 41 (1988) [hereinafter First-Mover Advantages]; Marvin B. Lieberman &
David B. Montgomery, First-Mover (Dis)advantages: Retrospective and Link with the Resource-
Based View, 19 STRAT. MGMT. J. 1111 (1998). But see Rajshree Agarwal & Michael Gort,
First-Mover Advantage and the Speed of Competitive Entry, 1887-1986, 44 J.L. & ECON. 161
(2001) (arguing that in recent history, being first to market confers less competitive advan-
tage than before).
39. See First-Mover Advantages, supra note 38, at 41-47 (discussing first mover advan-
tages from technological leadership, research and development, patents, pre-emption of
scarce assets and switching costs).
40. See Barriers to Entry, supra note 5, at 738.
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"monopolies" or "cartels" might persist, even in the absence of intentional
discrimination.4 Using this model, I argue that Whites monopolized access
to resources and opportunities during slavery and segregation, and this early
White monopoly advantage has now become locked into institutional
structures and processes.
For example, in earlier work, I have argued that discriminatory
practices in law school admissions have become locked in because of
switching costs associated with moving away from the use of standard-
ized testing in admissions.4 2 Over time, law schools increasingly have
come to rely on the Law School Admissions Test ("LSAT"), despite the
fact that the test disproportionately and unfairly excludes applicants of
color. As has been true during the entire time the LSAT has existed, reli-
ance on LSAT scores disproportionately excludes Black and Latino
applicants on the basis of race and class.43 Even in the face of the test's
discriminatory impact, however, few law schools have stopped using the
LSAT in their admissions process.
This is largely because any law school choosing to eliminate the test
or reduce its weight would face significant potential switching costs in
doing so.4 In particular, a school risks a potentially significant drop in its
ranking in U.S. News and World Report, and thereby risks a corresponding
loss of reputation, enrollments, employability of graduates, and funding
from alumni donors.45
The LSAT example also demonstrates the role that positive feed-
back can play in locking in early White monopoly advantage." The more
highly placed a law school is in the rankings, the more easily it will at-
tract candidates with high LSAT scores. In turn, the higher the LSAT
scores, the better a law school does in the rankings. Thus, the law
school's position in the rankings depends on LSAT scores and LSAT
scores in turn depend on rankings. 4' Because of this self-reinforcing feed-
back loop, conventional law school criteria become progressively more
locked in and harder to dismantle, despite the fact that they dispropor-
tionately exclude Blacks, Latinos, and other racial groups. 8
Third, continuing White dominance in economic and educational
opportunities exhibits the quality of path dependence. Again, path
dependence is the notion that early historical events play a significant role
in determining market outcomes long afterwards.49 In the LSAT
41. See id. at 754-55.
42. See id. at 775-78.
43. See id. at 763.
44. See id. at 774-75.
45. See id. at 767-69.
46. See id. at 764-75.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 764.
[VOL. 9:31
FALL 2003] Locked in Inequality 41
example, I pointed out that law schools developed and adopted the
LSAT during the turn of the century, at a time when it was routine and
uncontroversial to exclude people of color from legal institutions."
Moreover, historical evidence indicates that standardized tests were
developed for the explicit purpose of excluding minorities. s
Given that history, it comes as no surprise that the LSAT continues
disproportionately to exclude applicants of color.12 In particular, the lock-
in model suggests that racial exclusion early during the formation of con-
temporary law schools provided Whites with a significant advantage that
has become self-reinforcing over time. Accordingly, this advantage has
now become locked into law school admissions because law schools are
not willing to pay the significant switching costs of eliminating the test.
In general, the market lock-in model of discrimination illustrates
two important points. First, existing racial disparities can be traced in
very specific ways to earlier discriminatory events, when one group has
manipulated the law and other social institutions to gain an unfair advan-
tage over another."3 Second, in the presence of certain dynamic forces,
racial disparities can become self-reinforcing and ultimately locked into
institutional structures and relationships, even in the absence of continu-
ing intentional discrimination. 4 The next section describes the early
historical events surrounding the South African government's decision to
charge school fees for public schools.
II. THE USER-FEE SYSTEM, PRESENT AND PAST
A. The Regulatory Framework of Public School Financing
The South African Schools Act ("SASA") and its accompanying
administrative regulations govern public school financing at the national
level.55 Passed in 1996, SASA attempts to redress inequities by relying on
private parental resources for wealthier schools to make up funding
50. See id. at 758-61.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 762-63; see also Daria Roithmayr, Deconstnicting the Distinction Between
Merit and Bias, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1449 (1997) (arguing that the LSAT's disproportionate
impact on applicants of color can be traced to the fact that aptitude tests were adopted by
institutions at the turn-of-the-century to exclude Jews and people of color).
53. See Barriers to Entry, supra note 5, at 785-87 (arguing that segregation played an
important path-dependent role in charting the subsequent evolutionary development of
race relations in the U.S.). In the U.S. context, the model has focused on current discrimi-
natory practices that were originally developed during the Jim Crow era but that persist
today, even after the enactment of civil rights legislation.
54. See id. at 788 (arguing that because discrimination is self-reinforcing, it persists
even in the absence of continuing intentional discrimination).
55. South African Schools Act, No. 84 (1996) [hereinafter SASA].
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shortfalls, and redistributing a relatively small portion of state funds to
needy schools. SASA funds school budgets from two different sources:
private sources and state funds. For many schools, particularly those that
were historically White, a substantial source of funds comes from school
fees. 6
Indeed, SASA actually requires communities to supplement state
funds: by charging privately generated user fees, by soliciting voluntary
contributions, or by supplementing resources in some other way. These
supplemental funds are then administered by the local school governing
body ("SGB"). 7 More specifically, Section 36 of SASA mandates that an
SGB "take all reasonable measures within its means to supplement the
resources supplied by the state in order to improve the quality of educa-
tion provided to all learners at the school.""8
Within the framework of this mandate for supplemental resources,
SASA grants discretion to the local community and SGB to decide
whether to charge fees. Section 39 of SASA permits schools to charge
fees if a resolution is adopted by a majority of parents attending the
school budget meeting. 9 Parents are permitted to determine both the
amount of the fees and the specific equitable criteria to exempt those
parents who are unable to pay them.6" Section 37 requires that school
fees be paid into the school fund, to be used only for educational pur-
poses. Under a 1997 amendment to SASA, Parliament expressly provided
that such fees could be used to hire additional educators, who are em-
ployed directly by the SGB.6
In an effort to temper the intrinsic discriminatory effect of school
fees, SASA requires partial or full exemption for families who cannot
afford to pay fees. At least in theory, the regulations prohibit SGBs from
excluding learners who cannot pay fees, although it is extremely impor-
tant to note that parents can be sued for failure to pay.6 2 Under these
regulations, SGBs must fully exempt parents whose income is less than
ten times the annual school fee, and partially exempt those whose
56. See S. AFR. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, A REVIEW OF THE FINANCING, RESOuRC-
ING AND COSTS OF EDUCATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 84 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 FINANCING
REPORT] (stating that private expenditures account for thirty-five percent of funding for
historically advantaged schools, but only eight to eleven percent of overall funding).
57. SASA requires that each public school create a "school governing body" of
parents, teachers, and learners, whose charge it is to administer and control the property of
the school and make decisions regarding school operating procedures. See SASA, supra
note 55, § 16.
58. See id. § 36.
59. See id. § 39.
60. See id.
61. Education Laws Amendment Act 100 of 1997 at 4-5 (amending § 20 of Act 84
of 1996) in 389 Government Gazette (No. 18480).
62. SASA, supra note 55, § 41.
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incomes are less than thirty times, but more than ten times, the fee.63
Partial exemptions are granted at the discretion of the SGB.6" However,
if parental incomes are more than thirty times the fee, parents cannot
qualify for any exemption." The regulations also provide for conditional
exemptions, which exempt families who can plead special circumstances,
either relating to a parent's ability to pay fees or ability to collect infor-
mation about income.66
In addition to private supplemental resources, SASA funds public
schools through state funds. These funds fall into one of three categories:
personnel funding, capital funding, and non-personnel, non-capital
("NPNC") funding used for operation and maintenance of schools. With
regard to NPNC funding, which makes up eight to ten percent of a
school's expenses, 7 SASA directs the government to create some form of
equitable redistribution to target the most disadvantaged schools.68 Under
this mandate, the Norms and Standards for School Funding ("Norms and
Standards") redistributes funds by equitably targeting funding on the basis
of "need." The regulations direct the government to determine need by
assessing the school's current capacity and quality.69 More specifically, the
Norms and Standards sets forth a "resource targeting table," which
63. See id. § 39 at paras. 129 (full exemption) and 131 (partial exemption). The
administrative regulations provide detail on the exemption procedures. Parents wishing to
qualify for an exemption must apply in writing, or in person if desired. See S. AFR.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, EXEMPTION OF PARENTS FROM PAYMENT OF SCHOOL FEES
REGULATIONS para. 4 (1998). When submitting an application, parents must provide
evidence of income, assets and liabilities, and other information requested by the SGBs.
Governing bodies must render a decision within twenty-one days of the application, and
if the governing body denies a request for exemption, parents have the right to appeal.
Although the exemption policy looks quite sound on paper, id. at paras. 5-7, as this
Article later discusses, the exemption regulations do not work well enough to provide
access to quality education for those who cannot pay.
64. See S. AFR. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, NATIONAL NoRMs AND STANDARDS FOR
SCHOOL FUNDING para. 132 (1998) available at http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/
policy/norms&standards.html [hereinafter NORMS AND STANDARDS]. The Norms and Stan-
dards are administrative regulations, issued by the Department of Education to implement
the requirements of SASA.
65. Id. at para. 133.
66. Id. at para. 134. In essence, this regulation makes it clear that exemptions do not
waive the parents' liability on any debt incurred for unpaid fees.
67. 2003 FINANCING REPORT, supra note 56, at 32 (stating that "[in most provinces,
personnel expenditure accounts for over 90% of public ordinary school expenditure").
68. In particular, Section 34(1) of SASA instructs that "[t]he state must fund public
schools from public revenue on an equitable basis in order to ensure the proper exercise of
the rights of learners to education and the redress of past inequalities in education provi-
sion." SASA, supra note 55, § 34(1).
69. See NORMS AND STANDARDS, supra note 64, at paras. 98-104, fig. 2 (targeting
schools for funding on the basis of need, which is defined to include an assessment of the
physical condition and crowding in the existing school, as well as an evaluation of the
relative poverty of the community served by the school).
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allocates a certain percentage of resources to schools based on their rank-
ing in a hierarchy of need.7" According to the statutory table, the poorest
twenty percent of school districts receive about thirty-five percent of
available NPNC resources, while the wealthiest twenty percent, which
are historically White, receive only five percent of the resources."1
As the next section will discuss, although the Department of Edu-
cation designed the Norms and Standards to target poor learners, poor
learners still receive less NPNC funding from the government than do
wealthier learners. This disparity is in part traceable to differing alloca-
tions from the national education budget to each province, and in part to
the differing ability of each province to raise supplemental provincial tax
revenue internally.72
In contrast to the progressive targeting of NPNC costs, until very
recently, the Norms and Standards have not equitably allocated funding
for personnel costs, which make up over ninety percent of school budg-
ets, and an even greater percentage in the poorest schools.73 Until this
year, all public schools received per teacher funding with regard to per-
sonnel costs, which included salaries for teaching and non-teaching
personnel. These salaries were uniform across schools and varied only to
reflect differences in seniority and qualifications. 4
Although the Norms and Standards regulations acknowledged sig-
nificant historical inequities in personnel," they left the crafting of a
remedy to negotiation between the Ministry of Education and the teach-
ers' unions.76 Beginning in 2003, however, teaching positions will be
70. Id. at fig. 2.
71. Id.
72. See 2003 FINANCING REPORT, supra note 56, at 22-23.
73. See Katerina Nicolaou, The Link Between Macroeconomic Policies, Education Policies
and the Education Budget, in THE STATE, EDUCATION AND EQUITY IN POST APARTHEID SOUTH
AFICA: THE IMPACT OF STATE POLICIES 53, 84 (Enver Motola & John Pampallis eds., 2002).
74. Historically White schools still employ a disproportionately high percentage of
the better-qualified teachers in public education. Early attempts to re-deploy the most
experienced teachers to the neediest schools failed completely, because those predomi-
nantly White teachers elected to take voluntary severance packages rather than teach in
historically disadvantaged schools. For a detailed history of teacher rationalization and its
failures, see Salim Vally & Console Tleane, The Rationalization of Teachers and the Quest for
Social Justice in Education in an Age of Fiscal Austerity, in THE STATE, EDUCATION AND EQUITY
IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: THE IMPACT OF STATE POLICIES 178 (Enver Motala &
John Pampallis eds., 2002) [hereinafter Rationalization].
75. See NORMS AND STANDARDS, supra note 64, at paras. 34, 37.
76. See id. at paras. 31, 38. Paragraph thirty-one provides for leaving the teaching
personnel funding to agreements between national teacher unions and Ministry of Educa-
tion, while paragraph thirty-eight commits the Ministry of Education to work on norms
for non-teaching personnel. Elsewhere, the regulations make clear that they do not deal
with personnel costs in provincial education departments, aside from establishing a set of




allocated in provinces according to an index of need. The index is calcu-
lated based on a number of factors, including available funding and the
size of the school, among other things." In addition to using the index,
the government will also allocate teaching posts according to the poverty
of the school, based on the resource tables that apply to non-personnel
funding." As Part III elaborates, school fees create racial disparities in
expenditures per learner. Fee rich schools generate significantly higher
expenditures per learner than do fee poor schools. This supplemental
system of fee financing did not originate with the new government's
drafting of SASA or the Norms and Standards. Rather, as the next sec-
tion makes clear, the origins of the user fee system can be traced directly
to the end of apartheid and to efforts by the NP to lock in White privi-
lege in education even after transformation.
B. The Evolution of Private Financing for Public Schools
1. Bantu Education During the Apartheid Regime
A carefully detailed early history of the school fee system is central
to understanding the lock-in argument in the context of user fees. At the
end of apartheid in the early 1990s, South Africa financed its public
schools in ways that varied according to the type of school. State schools
relied completely on the state for funding." For these schools, funding
varied significantly. The relatively well-resourced schools attended by
Whites, Coloureds, and Indians received generous state allocations. In
comparison, schools serving Black learners received far less money to
serve a greater number of students.8"
More specifically, the state provided all funds for the country's ex-
clusively White schools, which were overseen by the House of
Assembly. Compared to other non-White state schools, these schools
garnered a dramatically disproportionate share of state resources.81 Al-
though White schools served only ten percent of the country's
population, they captured R4.3 billion in financing, almost four-fifths of
77. See Government Notice 23783/2002 at 7-11, available at http://www.gov.za/
gazette/notices/2002/23783.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2003).
78. See id.
79. See S. AFR. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO REVIEW
THE ORGANISATION, GOVERNANCE AND FUNDING OF SCHOOLS § 3.6 (1995) [hereinafter
HUNTER COMMITTEE REPORT] (on file with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
80. Although Black learners make up about eighty-five percent of the country's
learners, Black schools received 5.2 billion rand in state funding, only one billion more
than the amount allocated forWhite learners. See id. § 3.9.
81. See SOUTH AFRICA INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS, RACE RELATIONS SURVEY:
1989/90,785-95 (1990) [hereinafter SOUTH AFRICA SURVEY 1989/90].
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the total amount allocated to Black learners.82 Compared to the White
schools, the House of Delegates schools (serving Indian learners) and the
House of Representatives schools (serving Coloured learners) received
significantly less per capita."
At the other end of the spectrum, the government allocated dra-
matically less funding to schools serving Black students. A segmented and
chaotic set of bureaucratic structures provided one education ministry for
each of the ten Bantustans and another ministry for Black communities
outside the Bantustans.84 Black schools served by the Department of Edu-
cation and Training (serving Blacks in White-designated areas) received
significantly more funding than those served by government education
departments in the independent and non-independent homelands."5
Unlike state schools, community schools in Black homelands were
subsidized only partly by the state, and depended on severely impover-
ished communities for the rest of their funding. 6 In yet another category,
farm schools serving the children of Black farm workers were wholly
subsidized by the state, much like state schools. Because farm schools
provided education for Black families, farm schools were among the
poorest and most poorly resourced in the country under the apartheid
regime."
In the final category, private or "independent" schools received
varying subsidies from the state. Independent schools ranged from well-
resourced schools serving an affluent elite to poorly resourced inner-city
schools catering to families seeking to escape the chaos of public educa-
tion. The category also included religious schools and other special group
schools, some of which were quite progressive in their decision to admit
Black students in spite of the government's opposition.88
82. See id. at 769.
83. See id. at 766. Historically, South Africans have been classified into one of four
racial categories: White, Coloured, Indian and Black. The evolution of the category Col-
oured, which loosely refers to persons of mixed descent, is chronicled in IA GOLDIN,
MAKING RACE: THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF COLOURED IDENTITY IN SouT AFRICA
(1987).
84. See School Governance Policy, supra note 9, at 147. According to the Columbia
Encyclopedia: "In 20th-century South African history, [Bantustans were defined as] terri-
tory that was set aside under apartheid for black South Africans and slated for eventual
independence. Ten bantustans (later generally referred to as homelands), covering 14% of
the country's land, were created from the former 'native reserves."' THE COLUMBIA ENCY-
CLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2001). Four were proclaimed independent-Transkei (1976),
Bophuthatswana (1977), Venda (1979), and Ciskei (1981)-but no foreign government
recognized them as independent nations. Id.
85. See School Governance Policy, supra note 9, at 147.
86. See HUNTER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 79, § 3.11.
87. See id.
88. See id. 5 3.28.
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2. Transition: "Choosing" Model C Schools and Fees
At the time that South Africa began its transition out of apartheid,
1983 schools, approximately thirteen percent of the total number of
South African schools, served the country's White learners.89 Ostensibly
to facilitate a smooth transition, the apartheid government agreed to ne-
gotiate with working groups over the future of these schools. However,
the government refused to consider integrating these schools until a
newly elected Black government was in place.9" Apartheid officials de-
clared that opening state schools to all races would lead to tremendous
chaos, because students needed to be separated in order to attend to cul-
tural needs."1
Even so, in the early 1990s, the NP began to take early steps to
partially desegregate White state schools. In 1990, President F.W. de
Klerk announced that White schools could begin to admit Black students
if a majority of parents approved an appropriate admissions policy for the
individual school. 2 To facilitate such a change, the Minister of Education
declared that the government would allow parents to vote to change
their school's legal status to permit Black enrollment.9
Parents voted on one of three alternative models. Voting to be-
come a Model A school made a state school completely private.94 Model
B schools remained state schools, but could admit Black students up to
fifty percent of the school's maximum enrollment.9" Model C schools
were designated as state-aided schools. These schools received seventy-
five percent of their budgets via state funding and were responsible for
supplying the remaining twenty-five percent through user fees and pri-
vate voluntary donations.96 Model C schools could also admit Black
students, but also only up to fifty percent of the school's enrollment.97 In
1992, the Minister of Education added a fourth alternative, the Model D
school. Model D schools would be allowed to recruit an unlimited
89. See School Governance Policy, supra note 9, at 145.
90. The government did agree, in the interim, to increase spending on Black edu-
cation. See Jakes Gerwel, Keynote Address: Back to Learn, in THE 1992 NATIONAL EDUCATION
CONFERENCE 24 (1993) (on file with author).
91. See SOUTH AFRICA SURVEY 1989/90, supra note 81, at 769.
92. See PAM CHRISTIE, OPEN SCHOOLS: RACIALLY MIXED CATHOLIC SCHOOLS IN
SOUTH AFRICA 1976-86 (1990).
93. De Klerk's minister of education, Piet Clase, described the change as a strategy
that "would make it possible for parents to exercise their choice with regard to admissions
policy for a specific school." See SOTH AFRCA SURVEY 1989/90, supra note 81, at 769.
94. See School Governance Policy, supra note 9, at 146.
95. Id.
96. See SouTH AFRICA INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS, SOUTH AFRICA SURVEY:
1996/97 (1997) [hereinafter SOUTH AFRICA SURVEY 1996/97].
97. See Where There's A Will ... , FINANCIAL MAIL (Johannesburg), Jan. 15, 1993, at
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number of Black students, in part to compensate for a declining enroll-
ment of White students in these particular schools."
At the end of the voting period, the majority of parent bodies in
White schools had voted to remain state, or "status quo" schools (either
Model B, C, or D). Roughly one-third (692 schools) voted to become
Model B schools, one school voted to become a Model A school, six
schools voted to become Model D schools, and fifty-one schools had
opted for Model C status.99 But in February 1992, the government un-
expectedly demanded that all Model B schools convert to the Model C
form and to charge fees.'" When restructuring was complete, in April
1992, ninety-six percent of White schools operated under the Model C
form and charged fees.' 1
Jenni Karlsson and her coauthors argue that the government
undertook such unilateral restructuring for two primary reasons. First,
Karlsson argues that the government shifted to a Model C user fee
system because it needed to supplement inadequate state revenues for
education.12  Because economic growth had been sluggish, the
government needed supplemental financial contributions from the
private sector to finance White schools at their generous apartheid-era
levels."°3 Second, and more controversially, Karlsson argues that by
restructuring in such a manner, the apartheid government was trying to
shift control of schools to local White communities and out of the hands
of a soon-to-be-elected democratic government which was certain to be
majority Black.0 4 At the time of restructuring, Black activists who
participated in pre-transition negotiations levied the same accusations.
Devan Pillay's commentary reflected the views of many of his colleagues:
Within the education sphere, the classification of most
[W]hite schools as Model C schools, which gives [W]hite par-
ents a decisive say in admissions criteria under the guise of
self-determination or local community democracy, falls
squarely within the logic of privatisation. What used to be
under the control of the central government will in future be
98. See School Governance Policy, supra note 9, at 146. These schools would have op-
erated under the aegis of the White Department of Education and Culture.
99. See id.
100. Specifically, the government declared that on April 1, 1992, all White schools,
except for Model D schools, would be required to convert to the Model C option unless
parents voted by a two-thirds majority to remain status quo state schools or Model B
schools. Most schools did not vote to retain their earlier status. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 146-47.
103. See id. at 147.
104. See id.
Locked in Inequality
under the control of local [W]hite elites (and in some cases
[B]lack elites). '
Those education activists who had participated in the struggle to eradi-
cate educational inequality found the switch to the Model C form and to
school fees to be a move towards racial stratification.
3. Transformation: The Hunter Committee
Such was the state of affairs when the ANC-led government took
the reins of power in 1994. The new Black-majority government
pledged to reorganize the above-described categories of schools, to
eliminate segmentation, and to merge what were previously fifteen sepa-
rate systems into a unified education system.' 6 In addition, the ANC
promised to create new national and provincial educational depart-
ments.
107
As part of its platform, the new government also pledged to modify
the user fee system in former Model C schools. In the government's First
White Paper on Education, the Minister of Education announced that he
intended to reform the user fee system to make it equitable."0 ' In that
paper, the government explicitly acknowledged that the charging of
school fees was at odds with the concept of a free education. 9 Indeed,
the government quite openly recognized that the user fee system was
likely to create inequality and to pose potential constitutional problems
under the South African constitutional guarantee of a right to educa-
tion.110
Shortly after transition, the government commissioned a panel of
experts to conduct an in-depth inquiry into education governance
and financing. The Department of Education appointed the Hunter
105. Devan Pillay, Negotiating a Way Out of the Education Crisis, in 1992 NATIONAL
EDUCATION CONFERENCE 40 (1993) (on file with author).
106. See HUNTER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 79, § 3.1.
107. See S AER. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, White Paper on Education and Training in a
Democratic South Africa: First Steps to Develop a New System pt. 3, ch. 9 (1995), available at http://
www.gov.za/whitepaper/1995/educationl.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2003) [hereinafter
White Paper 1].
108. See id. § 13(3) (describing user charges). The system inherits a completely un-
systematic pattern of user charges, from grade school through the university level, which is
linked to the former ethnic organization of provision. This must be reviewed from top to
bottom and re-designed in an equitable, sustainable, market-related and publicly accept-
able way. The urgent priority has been to begin meeting the commitment to free and
compulsory general education in a way that is seen by the people as both fair and neces-
sary, even if this involves the encouragement of voluntary contributions by parents to
school development funds to supplement the state provision. See id.
109. See id. § 15(3).
110. See id.
FALL 2003]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
Committee (a panel of government officials, education activists, and
outside experts) to evaluate three different school financing models.'
Option One, the "minimalist-gradualist" approach, gradually
phased in requirements to equalize both personnel and non-personnel
funding. At the same time, Option One left in place pre-existing
designations of schools as state or state-aided.1 '2 Under this option, some
public schools would have been able to levy compulsory fees from
parents, but other schools would not. '
Option Two, the "equitable school-based formula" approach, em-
phasized an immediate move toward per capita equity in funding.
Towards that end, this option generated a formula to allocate resources
on the basis of student enrollment. 4 The government was expected to
equalize per capita state expenditures across the board, so that all schools
would receive an allocation of funds based strictly on student enrollment.
Option Three, the "partnership funding" approach, emphasized the
use of parent-generated tuition fees and voluntary contributions from the
community. Option Three advocates argued that relying on parents to
supplement state funding would allow the government to target state
funds towards the neediest schools. Option Three specifically proposed
generating supplemental funds through user fees, in the form of manda-
tory fees, voluntary fees, or some combination thereof1 1 '
The Hunter Committee ultimately endorsed Option Three as the
alternative which "offered the most advantages as a strategy for financing
schools in the period of transition . . . The approach provide[d] a frame-
work within which parents who can afford to, both Black and White,
are required to make contributions to the education of their children."'1 6
The Committee also recommended that all categories of schools collapse
into two categories: public (to include all pre-existing categories receiv-
ing funding from the state except private) and independent (or private)., 7
The Committee conceded that "the implementation of an obliga-
tory school fee [was] in tension with policy commitments to free and
compulsory schooling."" 8 Accordingly, the Committee insisted on a
111. See HUNTER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 79, § 1.1 (describing the appoint-
ment and constitution of the Committee).
112. See id. § 7.24-7.30.
113. See id. 5 7.29.
114. See id. 7.31-7.37.
115. See id. 7.47.
116. See id. § 7.70.
117. See id. % 5.13-5.16.
118. See id. § 7.48.The Hunter Committee Report states:
While this could be interpreted as in some way compromising the commit-
ment to free and compulsory education, this approach will in face ensure
that free and compulsory education is available to all who require it .... This
option would ensure that students from poorer families could have access to
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provision to prevent children from being expelled for non-payment of
fees, a requirement that was ultimately codified in SASA.' 9 Despite its
reservations, the Hunter Committee ultimately endorsed user fees as a
way to supplement government funding shortfalls. In defending its
choice, the Committee stressed the state's inability to fully fund quality
education for all. 12 The Committee noted that the state could not afford
to increase the total education budget in order to equalize expenditures
for students: it would not be "possible, without a significant increase in
real budgetary allocations over the next five years, to meet the require-
ments of restructuring, and of providing for qualitative improvements in
the under-resourced schools .... "121
4. Enter the Experts
After receiving the Hunter Committee report, the Department of
Education solicited additional advice from two international consultants,
Luis Crouch and Professor Christopher Colclough. 22 In contrast to the
Hunter Committee, the international consultants' final report expressed a
strong preference for a version of Option Two, the equitable formula
option. The experts' report also strongly recommended that schools be
permitted to charge user fees to parents who could afford to pay.
123
Colclough and Crouch argued that the practice of charging user fees was
necessary to "assure the long-term fiscal health of public education, and
would more likely result in keeping important stakeholders fully engaged




120. See id. § 7.15.
121. See id. In choosing user fees as the preferred source of additional funds, the
Committee considered, but rejected, the possibility of additional taxation to mobilize
additional resources: "In view of the pressures on the revenue base, and difficulties in en-
suring that tax revenue is allocated to education, [the Committee] favours parental
contributions." Id. § 7.46.
122. John Samuel, the Deputy Director General of Systems and Resources within
the Department, and Trevor Coombe, also the Deputy Director General of Systems and
Resources, specified the scope of work undertaken by the consultants. Luis A. CROUCH,
SCHOOL FUNDING OPTIONS AND MEDIUM-TERM BUDGETING FOR EDUCATION IN SOUTH
AFRICA 3 (Nov. 1995) (unpublished consultants' report) (on file with author) [hereinafter
EXPERTS' REPORT]. Luis Crouch is an education economics expert employed by the Re-
search Triangle Institute in North Carolina in the U.S., while Christopher Colclough is a
professor of economics at the University of Sussex in the United Kingdom. Id.
123. See id. at 1 ("The modification we propose would be that school governance
committees should be able to levy fees that are in some sense compulsory but not exclu-
sionary of those without ability to pay.").
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with public education, leading to better budgets and accountability.' 24 In
particular, the consultants argued that user fees were essential to avoid
the flight of middle and high-income families (almost all of whom were
White) from public to private education. In their view, user fees were
necessary to prevent "key technocrats and opinion-makers" from
transferring their children out of public education to private or
"independent" schools.1 25 According to the experts, this group of key
people included those at the "upper end of the income spectrum,' '1 6 not
just the very rich, but also the top four or five rungs of civil service, the
upper middle-income professions, and members of teachers' unions. 
12 7
For Luis Crouch it was important to "keep [this group] reasonably
happy" '128 in order to prevent them from deserting public education in
favor of private schools. According to Crouch, opinion-maker departure
would mean lower levels of funding overall for public education:
It is important to emphasize that the criterion on 'prevention
of opinion-maker flight' is not based on what some might
judge an inappropriately tender concern for the wealthy or
the upper middle class. It is based instead on the very real fact
that strong redress requires relatively high levels of spending
on education, and such levels of spending will only material-
ize, or remain available to the public sector, if the opinions of
budget-makers are favorable to the public system, which
means that they must feel personally committed to it.'
29
Moreover, according to the experts, lower funding levels were
linked in turn to a potential collapse of public education. In their view,
eliminating fees would trigger a two-step dynamic process that would
cause public education to collapse. In the first step, reductions in funding
would cause middle and high-income parents to relocate their children
to private schools in response to any significant reduction in funding.'30
According to Colclough and Crouch, in the absence of user fees, the
wealthiest ten percent of the population would flee public education for
private schools at a point when their willingness to pay for education was
more than twice the level of available state support.' In the experts
view, this tendency would be further exacerbated if state spending was
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 10 (evaluating in chart form the fiscal sustainability of Option 2).
127. See id. at 9.
128. See id. at 10.





targeted toward the neediest sectors of the population, because it would
reduce the amount of state support available for the wealthy.
32
In the second step, these defections of the middle-class and wealthy
opinion-makers would trigger a reduction in government spending for
public education. More specifically, the experts assumed that educational
funding as a share of Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") spending would
drop by one percent for every ten percent of the total student population
who fled to the private sector.3 3 The experts predicted that this would
happen because the most vocal advocates for public spending would no
longer be in the system to agitate for more funding.'
Moreover, Colclough and Crouch predicted that this two-step
process of defections followed by reductions would become self-
reinforcing. Each round of defections would produce further reductions,
which in turn would produce even more defections.' 5 According to the
experts, this downward spiral ultimately would result in the collapse of
the public education system.'36 To avoid such collapse, the experts rec-
ommended keeping the level of funding constant for those most likely to
defect, primarily via user fees.
137
5. The Evolution of SASA
The government appeared to agree completely with the experts
in its second White Paper on Education in 1996.' 3 The Ministry of
Education incorporated the experts' arguments relating to opinion-maker
flight and reductions in government spending. "9 The government also
132. See id.
133. See id. at app. B-I ("We assume that support to education as a share of GDP
will decline one percentage point for every ten percentage points that the proportion of




137. See id. at 11 (assessing in chart form the ability of Option 2 to prevent opinion
and decision-maker flight, as well as its ability to be implemented).
138. See South African Department of Education, A Draft Policy Document for Discus-
sion: The Organisation, Governance and Funding of Schools, General Notice 1229 of 1995,
available at http://www.gov.za/whitepaper/1995/education2.htm [hereinafter "White
Paper I"].
139. See id. at 5.24. The committee's version of Option Two would, in (the consult-
ants') view, have a fatal consequence. In the consultants' view, over the five year period
during which budgetary allocations to schools are re-organised in favour of equity and
redress, the decline in public funding for the previously privileged schools would propel
middle-class parents out of the public school sector and into the independent school
sector. Among those departing would be many opinion-formers and decision-makers
whose influence in favour of sustained or enhanced public funding for public education
would consequently tend to diminish. This inference is based on observation of interna-
tional trends in other transitional economies.
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appeared to favor the experts' Option Four and an unequivocal
government endorsement followed soon thereafter. 4 '
In January 1996, the Department of Education furthered its com-
mitment to fees in a School Finance Task Team memorandum.' 4 ' The
Task Team acknowledged that an equitable spending strategy necessarily
would produce sharp spending cuts for "historically better funded"
schools.'42 And, like the consultants, the Team concluded that an exodus
of opinion-makers to private schools would deprive the public system of
an important source of private contributions.'43 Declining budgets for
education and an eroding base of private support would produce, in
turn, "an unstoppable cycle of mediocrity and unaccountability.""' Like
the Hunter Committee, the Team recommended user fees to supplement
funding for middle-income and wealthier families.'
Shortly after the memo, the Ministry moved to draft provisions
adopting the experts' funding model. In March 1996, Parliament tabled a
bill that adopted most features of Option Four, the consultant-generated
model that focused on school fees.' 6 Public reaction to draft legislation was
swift and critical. Speaking on behalf of many commentators, the educa-
tional policy units ("EPUs") from several universities pointed out that
Option Four extended the basic financial feature of the Model C system,
the use of private fees to supplement state funding, to the entire system.
The EPUs unanimously rejected the concept of user fees, arguing that this
feature perpetuated existing inequalities in access to education. According
to the University of Witswatersrand Education Policy Unit, "[t]hose who
have benefited from the system in the past ... will continue to have access
to superior education (though admittedly they would have to make larger
contribution out of their own pockets)."' 47
140. See White Paper II, supra note 138, at 5.27 (describing the consultants' option as
"thought provoking" and "serious"). However, the government noted that it had not yet
had time to fully digest the international consultants' report, and promised to issue a sepa-
rate paper on financing. See id. at 5.4.
141. See South African Department of Education, A Draft School Finance Policy, Coun-
cil of Education Ministers and Portfolio Committee on Education (Feb. 26-27, 1996) (on file
with author) [hereinafter School Finance Task Team Memo]. The Task Team was made up of
members from the Financial and Fiscal Commission, several government departments, the
Hunter Review Committee and the international consultants. See id. at 1.
142. See id. at 8.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 9 (noting that "[tihe solution would seem to be to make public spend-
ing on education as progressive as is reasonably possible ... while making it possible for
the middle and higher income earners to commit sufficient private funds to their chil-
dren's schools to provide them with the incentive to stay within the public system").
146. See Memorandum from the Educational Policy Unit at the University of




In addition, the EPUs complained that the redistributive potential
of fee-charging schools was inherently limited. In the EPUs' view, each
school had a financial incentive to admit fewer poor parents who could
qualify for an exemption from fees, or so-called free riders who would
benefit from facilities without contributing. "8 The EPUs predicted that,
if the number of exempted families increased beyond a certain number,
middle-class and wealthy parents would become increasingly likely to
shift their resources to independent schools.'49
Despite similar objections from the teachers' unions and many pub-
lic interest groups, Parliament passed the SASA in substantially the same
form as the earlier draft legislation."' The Act retained the user-fee sys-
tem from the former Model C schools, extending the option of charging
fees to all public schools in the system. The accompanying Norms and
Standards also required the progressive redistribution of school funding
for NPNC funds, but left in place the funding of personnel at a flat rate
amount per teacher or staff member."'
The school fee system has operated in South Africa for the last
seven years. Recently, in 2003, the South African Department of Educa-
tion conducted an inquiry investigating the effect of school fees on
school financing, and shortly thereafter issued a Plan of Action designed
to remedy some of the problems associated with fees.12 The Plan of Ac-
tion proposed eliminating school fees for the country's poorest schools
and created a national resource table to equalize NPNC funding across
provinces.' 3 None of the Plan's provisions have yet been enacted.
III. SCHOOL FEES IN ACTION: MEASURES OF INEQUALITY
The user fee system creates significant disparities between the
rich and poor, and relatedly between Blacks and Whites. Middle and
high-income White communities can afford to pay user fees and solicit
private contributions, and fee-rich communities provide a significant
amount of private funds to finance additional school resources. In
contrast, poor and working-class Black communities, who do not have
similar access to private funds, cannot afford to provide the same
additional resources. The differences between fee-rich and fee-poor




150. See SASA, supra note 55.
151. See NoMs AND STANDARDS, supra note 64, 5§ 98-103 (redistributing NPNC
allocations); § 31-34 (addressing personnel funding).
152. See 2003 FINANCING REPORT, supra note 56.
153. S. AFR. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, PLAN OF ACTION (une 15, 2003) (on file
with author).
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Of course, inequality has pervaded the financing of South African
public education for much, if not all, of the country's history. In the
early 1990s, at the end of apartheid, the government was still allocating
nearly five times as much money to the nation's White students as to its
Black ones.14 Nine years after transition, significant racial and class dis-
parities still exist in public school funding. The Department of Education
has conceded that school fees provide significant resources to fee rich
schools and thereby create dramatic disparities in expenditures per
learner.'5
Specifically, the Department's report estimates that school fees in
2002 contributed between R3.5 and R5.0 billion to schooling, or be-
tween eight percent and eleven percent of all expenditures on public
schools." 6 In the wealthiest twenty percent of the population, contribu-
tions from school fees make up thirty-five percent of total
expenditures. 5 ' In the poorest sixty percent of families, fees contribute
only between .5% and 2.5%.58 Most importantly, total public plus private
expenditures per learner are fifty percent higher for the wealthiest twenty
percent of learners than for the other eighty percent.
1 9
Research at the provincial level confirms the Department of Educa-
tion's findings of disparity. A recent study conducted by scholars at the
University of Witswatersrand Educational Policy Unit in the Gauteng
province concluded that user fees contributed significantly to inequalities
in expenditures per learner." In this regard, the study confirmed several
relevant facts. First, the vast majority of Gauteng schools receive no or
negligible income through parental contribution via school fees. 6' Not
surprisingly, these "fee-poor" schools are located in communities that
rank in the bottom three quintiles of the government's assessments of
community poverty. In contrast, historically White schools obtain a very
high proportion of their budgets through parent contributions. Not sur-
prisingly, they are located in communities that rank in the top two
quintiles of community wealth (which are predominantly White).62
154. See 2003 FINANcING REPORT, supra note 56.





160. See K. Porteus et al., Budget Analysis for the Education Portfolio Committee of the
Gauteng Provincial Legislature, Budget Statement 2001/2002: Vote 5 Budget for the Gauteng
Department of Education, 8 Q. REv. OF EDUC. AND TRAINING 3 (2001).




Second, the Gauteng research graphically illustrates the dramatic
differences that school fees create in total expenditures per learner.
63
Some of the existing disparity is traceable to differences in state fund-
ing.' Even so, the disparities associated with state funding pale in
comparison to the level of inequality in funding traceable to school fees.
The research in Gauteng makes clear that a very significant portion of
the disparities in funding per learner can be traced directly to the addi-
tional funding provided by school fees.'" As is discussed later, these
disparities are still very strongly correlated to race.
Third, the research indicates that disparities in fees translate to dis-
parities in funding for personnel, because fee-rich schools use their fees
to hire additional personnel.'66 Supplemental teachers in turn create lower
learner to teacher ratios.' Likewise, additional fees translate into lower
learner to classroom ratios and higher matriculation rates.'" In addition,
the Gauteng research indicates a correlation between the amount of fees
that a school collects and both its class sizes and passing rates for matricu-
lation exams.' '" As one commentator noted, "current policy privileges
more resourced schools."' 7
Because middle and high-income families can collect more fees,
and all fees go directly to the school, schools serving those communities
can spend more per learner. Using hypothetical user fees within the
range of common practice, the Budget Information Service of the Insti-
tute for Democracy in South Africa ("IDASA") confirms the differential
impact on a school's budget of its ability to charge fees for learners." '
IDASA's research compares the annual budget for a hypothetical "rich"
and "poor" school with the same number of learners and teachers.1
2
163. See id. at 4 (Fig. 3 depicting the ordinary school fund by school economic rank
and Fig. 4 depicting the total school income from state funds and private contributions
and showing that the three quintiles at the low end of the socio-economic spectrum
compare unfavorably to the top two).
164. Recently completed research on funding demonstrates inequality across prov-
inces in actual expenditures per learner by the government. For example, Gauteng (a
relatively wealthy province) allocates thirty percent more in per-learner expenditures than
KwaZulu-Natal. See 2003 FINANCING REPORT, supra note 56, at 22.
165. See id. at 22-23.
166. Id. at 22 (Fig. 5).
167. S. AFR. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL REVIEW 48 (1999),
available at http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/ifr/1999/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2003).
168. See Porteus et al., supra note 160, at 5-6.
169. See id. at 6.
170. See id.
171. See id. Even with redistribution of non-personnel expenses, schools in the
poorer socio-economic brackets still receive less funding per learner than schools in the
higher brackets. Specifically, personnel funding still favors historically advantaged schools,
primarily because (despite efforts at redeployment) those schools employ more experi-
enced and qualified teachers. See id.
172. See id.
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Their calculations assume that the "rich" school charges R2500 annually
per learner, while the "poor" school charges only R50 per learner. 17 3 Ac-
cording to the calculations, even after taking into account the targeted
allocations towards the poor school for non-personnel costs, the rich
school spends R4178 per learner, while the poor school spends less than
half of that amount, R2046 per learner.
17 4
Those who favor school fees argue that the exemption system al-
lows all learners to attend fee rich schools. As discussed above, the
Norms and Standards require SGBs to fully exempt from fees those fami-
lies whose incomes are less than ten times the annual fee, and to exempt
partially families whose incomes fall between ten and thirty times the
fee.17' For several reasons, however, the exemption scheme does not ade-
quately address racial or class disparities in expenditures. First, because
South African communities and provinces are highly segregated, fee ex-
emptions do not help to eradicate inequality because students are rarely
admitted across district lines.176 More specifically, students are admitted
under an informal "soft zoning" admissions process, in which students
who apply for admission across district lines are given lower priority.
First priority is given to students whose families live within the district or
whose parents work in the district. 77
In operation, most SGBs regulate enrollment so that no more than
thirty percent of the population comes from working-class or poor
families outside the feeder district. '78 This system excludes predominantly
poor Black students from outside the zone, who either are not admitted
because all spots have been filled with higher priority students, or are
excluded because they cannot negotiate transport to distant schools.1 79
Even if an individual student theoretically could get into a fee-rich
school, the vast majority of poor and working-class Black learners in
rural areas will be unable to attend because these schools are concentrated
almost exclusively in big cities."
Second, additional fees create barriers to entry for fee-rich schools.
Although the regulatory procedure in theory exempts families from pay-
ing onerous school fees, many SGBs separate out secondary fees-fees for
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See NoRMs AND STANDARDS, supra note 64.
176. For a critique of the soft zoning provisions of SASA, see Editorial, Between
Vision and Practice: Policy Processes and Implementation, 3 Q. REV. OF EDUC. AND TaAINING 4
(1996).
177. See id.
178. Interview with Brain Fleisch, Professor of Education at University of Wit-
watersrand, Educational Policy Unit and former deputy director general for the Provincial
Department of Education in Gauteng (May 23, 2002).
179. See EXPERTS' REPORT, supra note 122, at 12.
180. Interview with Brain Fleisch, supra note 178.
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transport, uniforms, stationery, textbooks, the PTA, exams, activities,
and special equipment and programs.'8 ' In many schools where those
secondary fees are calculated separately from attendance fees, the govern-
ing body does not make the secondary fees eligible for exemption.
18 2
According to the Department of Education itself, these so-called "hidden
fees" amount to twenty-five percent of the official fees charged by the
schools.' 3 Therefore, these secondary fees can be almost as onerous, if
not more onerous, than fees charged for attendance. A recent statement
by the World Bank Director of Education indicates that, for the region,
the highest share of household expenditures on education were for sec-
ondary fees and not tuition.'84 Indeed, uniform fees can cost an average
of R500 for a learner in Grade One; because children grow quickly out
of their uniforms, such expenses recur on a relatively regular basis.' 5
Similarly, transport fees can cost as much as R1100 per year, depending
on the distance to be traveled.
Research confirms that exemption schemes like SASA's generally
do not work well enough to protect the poor from the impact of fees. As
many as seventeen percent of all South African schools do not follow
exemption procedures at all, and at least fifteen percent of those that do
engage in illegal conduct, for example, excluding learners who are ex-
empt from attending school.8 6
Even for those schools that follow exemption procedures to the let-
ter, the exemptions do not offer adequate relief to poor families for
several reasons. Income-based exemption schemes do not accurately
measure poverty and ability or willingness to pay.' 7 In addition, exemp-
tion schemes are often implemented in informal and ad hoc ways, and
are stigmatizing and dehumanizing, which discourages applications. For
example, many families find that applying for exemption requires them
to "parade their poverty" in front of school administrators.' In other
sectors, experience with waivers of user fees has proved less than satisfac-
tory. In the health care sector, for example, very few of those who are
181. See id.
182. See 2003 FINANCING REPORT, supra note 56, at 89.
183. See id.
184. See Ruth Kagia, Director of Education for World Bank, at http://
www.campaignforeducation.org/-html/news/welcome/frameset.shtrnl (last visited Nov.
24,2003).
185. See Margaret de Paravanici, Your Million Rand Signature, at http://
www.school.co.za (last visited Aug. 15, 2002) (on file with author).
186. See 2003 FINANCING REPORT supra note 56, at 95.
187. See Sanjay Reddy & Jan Vandemoortele, User Financing of Basic Social Services: A
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eligible to receive waivers for user fees actually end up receiving the
waivers.189
In assessing the general state of public school finance, South African
education scholars have noted the dramatic impact of fees:
[I]t is clear that the existence of school fees acts as an exclu-
sionary mechanism for poorer parents as does the fact that
most of the better-resourced schools are, in general, long dis-
tances from the areas where most poorer people live, thus
requiring considerable transport costs. ... The result may well
be that the poorest schools remain poor (though some may
experience marginal improvements) while the formerly privi-
leged schools will actually improve their resource bases
through the contributions of parents. ,90
Indeed, even the Minister of Education has acknowledged the link
between user fees and inequality. In a 2001 status report, Minister Kader
Asmal recognized explicitly that the reliance on user fees perpetuates
educational inequality:
Inequality in education, and more generally, continues to be
one of the most vexing issues for the Education Ministry. In-
come inequality is simultaneously an object of equity
strategies and a factor that mediates these strategies. Wealthier
parents are able to maintain relative privilege in schools
through school fees; poorer parents cannot. '9
Despite these disparities, the new democratic government shows no signs
of moving to equalize expenditures per learner to eliminate the
inequality.
189. According to a seminar conducted in October 1998 by the World Bank Opera-
tions Evaluation Department ("OED"), the government of Zimbabwe introduced waivers
for the poor to minimize the impact of user fees in health care in the early 1990s. Fewer
than twenty percent of the eligible poor ended up receiving the waiver. Similarly, on
OED site visits to Mali, officials found no examples of fee waivers being granted by
community managed health centers, even though a waiver scheme had been established.
See William Newbrander & Timothy Johnston, Protecting the Poor from the Impact of Increased
User Charges: "hat Works?, World Bank Health and Poverty Seminar Report 2, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/health/library/oct98seminar.pdf (last visited Nov. 24,
2003).
190. See School Governance Policy, supra note 9, at 175-77.
191. See K. Asmal, Education Transformation and Change in South Africa:A Review 1997-
2001 (2001), available at http://education.pwv.govza (last visited June 15, 2003).
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IV. BARRIERS TO ENTRY
A. Locked-In Discrimination: User Fees
This section argues that the user-fee system in South Africa consti-
tutes an example of locked-in discrimination. Adopted during the
apartheid-era to discriminate against people of color, the user-fee system
and its accompanying disparities have now become locked into place
because the new government is unwilling to pay the significant switching
costs associated with a less discriminatory system of funding. The story of
user fees in South Africa appears to conform to the lock-in model of dis-
crimination in three ways. First, government decision-makers appear to
be motivated to continue the use of discriminatory user fees because of
switching costs and not because of any intent to discriminate.192 Second,
the narrative demonstrates that the White monopoly advantage of apart-
heid appears to have become self-reinforcing over time. Third, the
school fee story demonstrates that the not-so-small historical event of
apartheid will continue to have significant and persistent effects on edu-
cational outcomes in a path dependent manner, even in the absence of
intentional discrimination.
B. Switching Costs
Knowing that fees would reproduce apartheid-era disparities, the
South African government nevertheless decided in 1996 to retain the
user-fee system to provide needed funds for public education. The gov-
ernment relied on fees not because it intended to discriminate, but
because school fees allowed the government to avoid choosing between
increasing the education budget and reducing expenditures per learner
for formerly privileged learners. Either of these choices would have in-
curred significant switching costs.
First, a choice to equalize upwards would have required a signifi-
cant budget increase. The national government could have chosen to
fund all education at the level of the most privileged learners, historically
White learners. However, a choice to fund at that level in the absence of
fees would have required the government to dramatically increase the
education budget. In 1996-1997, the school year that SASA passed, the
192. Indeed, some would argue that as a Black-majority government, the new ad-
ministration could not have intended to discriminate against Blacks when it adopted
school fees. On the other hand, one might argue that the new government has substituted
class discrimination, favoring growing of the middle-class and privileging of the wealthy
at the expense of the poor and working class, for racial discrimination. Certainly for the
decision makers in question, who as members of the newly emerging Black elite were
best positioned to make a move to the historically advantaged schools, these costs were
significant. See School Governance Policy, supra note 9, at 170.
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ANC Minister of Education reported that to racially equalize educational
funding, the government would need to spend as much as 10.5% of the
Gross National Product ("GNP"), as compared to the seven percent ex-
pended in that year.1 93 Historical racism explained the need for the
additional 3.5%. Under the apartheid regime, White schools (and to a
lesser extent, Coloured schools) had garnered a dramatically dispropor-
tionate level of resources. Indeed, the government had financed White
schools at 185% of the national average, the Coloured communities at
159% of the national average, and Indian schools at 161% of the national
average.19 In contrast, the government had provided Black schools with
as little as seventy-four percent of the national average in the non-
independent homelands, and sixty-seven percent in the independent
homelands.19 Even earlier, in 1991-1992, the government had spent
R4448 per annum on White learners but only R1248 per learner on
Blacks. 196 Not surprisingly, then, any effort to remedy these gross dispari-
ties would have required a significant increase in the education budget if
the government were to equalize upwards.
Moreover, at that particular point in time, any government in-
creases in the budget would have incurred a significant political risk.
Specifically, such spending would have contravened the new govern-
ment's self-imposed macro-economic program, Growth, Employment,
and Redistribution ("GEAR"). In the mid 1990s, the government had
adopted GEAR, a self-imposed structural adjustment program, primarily
to avoid dependence on foreign loans and to attract foreign investment. '
Representing a shift from the prior emphasis on redistribution and re-
dress in its Reconstruction and Development Program ("RDP"), GEAR
emphasized fiscal discipline and improving economic infrastructure to
encourage economic growth. 9 '
Budget increases in education would have signaled a departure from
GEAR principles and would have risked the flight of White businesses. 99
The ANC had adopted GEAR in part to avoid a massive flight of (pre-
dominantly) White capital from the country, and to attract foreign
investment, much of which depended on the domestic investment cli-
mate. 200 Because the ANC had been unable to wrest control of the South
193. See SouTH AFmCAN SURVEY 1996/97, supra note 96, at 171 (citing to remarks by
Minister Bengu).
194. See id. at 171-72.
195. See id.
196. See SouTH AFRICA INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS, RACE RELATIONS SURVEY:
1993/94 (1994).
197. See Nicolaou, supra note 73, at 64-67.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 67.
200. See HEIN MARAIS, SouTH AFmCA LIMITS TO CHANGE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
TRANSFORMATION (1988) (on file with author) [hereinafter LIMITS TO CHANGE]. It is worth
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African economy from White capital, the ANC needed to reassure busi-
ness owners by promoting a macro-economic program that emphasized
growth instead of redistribution."' Accordingly, the government feared
that any move to increase budget expenditures for the poor or to redis-
tribute funds in education would have violated the terms of this
compromise with White business and encouraged the flight of White
capital to the United Kingdom and other countries.0 2
Second, and in the alternative, a choice to equalize downwards
would have potentially triggered White flight and endangered overall
levels of spending for public education. The national government could
have chosen to equalize expenditures per learner at some level below that
of historically White schools in order to avoid any increase in the budget.
The experts concluded, however, that such a choice would risk trigger-
ing the flight of White middle and high-income families from public
schools and would endanger the health of the public education system.2 3
More specifically, in the absence of either user fees or additional al-
locations from the government, the government could only have
equalized funding for all by reducing funding for privileged White learn-
ers to the level then provided to Indian and Coloured schools.0 4 In the
experts' view, such significant reductions in available funding inevitably
would have triggered defections by wealthy and middle-class families to
private schools.20 '
In turn, the government feared that defections by middle and high-
income families would have triggered reductions in the overall level of
public spending by the government on public education. The consult-
ants' report outlined the relationship between defections and reductions
in spending:
In our experience, and we believe empirical evidence would
support us, in systems where, say, the top 10% of the decision
and opinion-makers abandon the public education sector, fis-
cal support for the sector becomes more and more difficult, in
a worsening spiral of mediocrity, lack of funding, and lack of
noting that GEAR was adopted the same year that the SAF, a collection of South Africa's
top fifty corporations (almost exclusively White-owned), published a critique of govern-
ment economic policy, calling for a reduction of the budget deficit (among other things).
See Jesmond Blumenfeld, Assessing South Africa's Growth Strategy, Royal Institute of National
Affairs (1999), at http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/riia/bljO1.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2003).
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See EXPERTS' -EPORT, supra note 122, at 9-12.
204. See id. at 9.
205. See id.
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accountability to the astute and powerful as well as to the ma-
jority.
206
Likewise, the Department of Education's School Finance Task
Team argued that user fees were necessary to "ensure the continued in-
terest and personal participation in public education of [a] key segment of
the emerging middle class. '27 Indeed, the team concluded that the mid-
dle-class constituted the "bulwark needed to maintain the fiscal base of
public education, which in turn [was] the only way to ensure a unified
system of education capable of significantly raising the floor on the edu-
cation the poorest receive."208
Thus, in the government's view, any decision to abandon school
fees risked the fiscal health of public education. According to the experts
and the Task Team, any significant drop in the quality of education for
White middle-class and wealthy families would compel them to flee pub-
lic education for private schools and to abandon their interest in
education as a public good. Without these important "opinion-makers"
and leaders to lobby for increased spending for education, the experts
predicted that the quality of public education would decline precipitously
as funding levels decreased." 9 To avoid this switching cost, the govern-
ment opted instead to supplement state funding with significant private
funding in the form of user fees.
Triggering White flight in public education would also have been
politically risky for the new South African government. The transition to
a new democratic order had promised an improvement in public educa-
tion for all. Indeed, it had offered the possibility that Black students
would be able to attend well-resourced, historically White schools. Given
the very large number of previously disadvantaged schools, any move to
equalize state spending without fees would have created dramatic reduc-
tions in funding for White schools, but would not have significantly
improved the schools that served the Black African majority.2 ° From a
political perspective, the ANC could not afford to reduce funding to
White learners, with little or no appreciable increase in funding for Black
schools to justify such reductions.
206. Id. at 9.
207. See School Finance Task Team Memo, supra note 141, at 9.
208. Id.
209. In fact, as Karlsson and her co-authors note, it is probably more likely that the
advocacy of middle and high-income parents on behalf of public spending for education
is likely to weaken because these parents can more directly influence the wealth of their
childrens' school via private fees. See School Governance Policy, supra note 9, at 177.




The user fee story also looks like a story of locked-in discrimination
in a second way-early White monopoly on educational resources has
now become self-reinforcing. Certainly Whites enjoyed monopoly power
over educational resources during the apartheid era in South Africa. But
White monopoly on resources and opportunities now persists because of
the institutional relationship between White political power and school
fees. More specifically, institutional relationships in education tie the fiscal
health of public school funding to White "opinion-maker" presence in the
public system, in a self-reinforcing cycle of positive feedback. In their
report to the government, experts Crouch and Colclough described the
two mutually reinforcing components of this feedback loop."' First, the
experts noted that reduced expenditures per learner would trigger the
flight of middle and high-income families from public schools. Accord-
ing to the experts' estimates, these families would defect to private
schools if state funding dropped below a particular threshold level. In
particular, families would defect when the amount they were willing to
pay out of pocket equaled or exceeded twice the level of state support.1
So, for example, if state funding dropped from R2500 to R1500 per stu-
dent, families who were willing to pay R3000 or more would flee to
private schools.1 3
Second, the experts pointed out that middle and high-income
White families will lobby for high expenditures per learner, and the ab-
sence of these families reduces expenditures per learner. According to the
experts, for every ten percent of students who flee to the private system,
the share of education funding as a proportion of the GDP would drop
by one percent.2 4 Moreover, each decrease in the level of educational
funding would trigger another round of defections, which in turn would
produce more spending reductions.1 5
To continue with the previous example, if the number of defecting
families reached ten percent of the student population, public spending
on education would drop by one percent of the GDP. This reduction
would produce a corresponding reduction in expenditures per learner,
and in turn would trigger another round of defections. So if expenditures
211. See EXPERTS' REPORT, supra note 122, at apps. A, B. It is very important to note
that the experts did not have time to quantify the model in the report and did not pro-
vide empirical date from Latin America or anywhere else to support their assumptions. Id.
at app. B-1.
212. See id. at app. A-4.
213. In the experts' view, this flight of opinion-makers would be further exacerbated
if state finding targeted needier schools and parents were not able to supplement shortfalls
through user fees. See id. at apps. A-6,A-7.
214. Id. at app. B-1.
215. See id.
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per learner dropped again from ,1500 to R1000, the reduction (accord-
ing to the experts' formula) would produce another round of defections,
this time by those families willing to pay R2000 or more out of pocket.
Thus, each drop in spending creates a round of defections to private
schools. In turn, each round of defections produces a corresponding drop
in spending and then another round of defections. Ultimately, when
spending and defections have cycled through the public school popula-
tion, the public education system eventually collapses.
This cycle of positive feedback constitutes an example of self-
reinforcing privilege for Whites. During the apartheid era, Whites
monopolized the advantages of a superior educational system to secure
significant advantages in terms of income, wealth, and political
sophistication. Over time, this competitive advantage has become self-
reinforcing, because the continued health of public education has come
to depend on the presence of these White middle and high-income
families who are sufficiently politically sophisticated to lobby for
adequate levels of spending. The presence of these families depends on
user fees, which reproduce their privilege. This is true even in the
absence of any continuing intent to discriminate by the government or
these families.
D. Path Dependence
Beyond the notion of switching costs and self-reinforcing feedback,
the user fee story also fits within the lock-in model of discrimination in a
third way-it illustrates the notion of path dependence. As with the
standard, English language QWERTY keyboard, the current "market
dominance" of funding for White learners in public education can be
traced to early historical events that significantly influenced the path of
development with regard to education financing. Having evolved during
apartheid in the context of a White monopoly on institutional power,
the public education system now has become structurally dependent on
that monopoly. It is not possible to dismantle the monopoly without
threatening the health of the system or the fiscal health of the country.
In the case of school fees, the government's decision to shift to the
Model C format at the beginning of the 1990s has had far-reaching and
long-term consequences. As Karlsson and her colleagues have noted, this
strategic move permitted Whites to retain local control over public edu-
cation even after the new Black-majority government had transitioned
into power."6 Circumstances have now transformed what might have
been a temporary arrangement into a self-reinforcing institutional prac-
tice. Because government revenues are insufficient to equalize education
for all at a high level, public education has come to depend on the ability
216. See School Governance Policy, supra note 9, at 147.
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of the wealthier schools to collect school fees. Having inherited this par-
ticular evolutionary path, the new government must pay significant
switching costs to chart a more egalitarian path.
In comparison to the U.S., it is perhaps less controversial to argue
that current institutional structures in South Africa are path-dependent,
that is, affected in fundamental ways by apartheid-era institutional prac-
tices. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that the financing of public
education in South Africa would not be affected by these very recent
historical events. Certainly the evolutionary story of public education
financing confirms the central role that apartheid played, and continues
to play, in structuring the current user-fee system.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LOCK-IN MODEL
FOR U.S. EQUAL PROTECTION LAW
In this section, I examine whether U.S. equal protection law can
address locked-in discrimination. In particular, I compare South African
and U.S. equal protection law and explore a hypothetical constitutional
challenge to school fees under both regimes. This comparative analysis
suggests two insights. First, U.S. anti-discrimination law is particularly ill-
equipped to address locked-in discrimination because the U.S. Equal
Protection Clause prohibits only intentional discrimination and does not
prohibit institutional lock-in. In contrast, the South African Equality
Clause does not restrict its focus to intentional discrimination by an indi-
vidual or institution. 17
Second, U.S. constitutional law (as well as South African law) is
able to take into account the notion of switching costs. Both the U.S.
Equal Protection Clause and the South African Equality Clause require
courts to determine whether the government is justified in limiting rights
to equality.
A. South African Equality Clause Jurisprudence
In a hypothetical challenge to school fees under the South African
Equality Clause, school fees might be unconstitutional because they re-
produce race and class inequalities. Under the South African
Constitution, Equality Clause analysis takes place in two steps. First, a
court determines whether the government has engaged in a prima facie
217. Although there are a number of federal statutes and state constitutional clauses
in the U.S. and South Africa that might prove useful, I have restricted the discussion to
constitutional equality clauses because constitutional equality law is the most easily com-
parable and the most directly relevant.
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violation of the right to equality under Section 9.2" Second, the court
determines whether such a violation is nevertheless justified under Sec-
tion 36, the General Limitations Clause. 2" The following sections analyze
each step in turn.
1. Equality Clause: Unfair Discrimination
Section 9 of the South African Constitution has several sub-clauses,
the most relevant of which is Section 9(3). This clause provides in rele-
vant part that "[t]he state may not unfairly discriminate directly or
indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including, race ...
ethnic or social origin, [or] colour .... 20 In making its initial claim
under the Equality Clause, a class of plaintiffs challenging school fees
would not need to allege intentional discrimination in the first instance
to make out a prima facie case under Section 9.2" To assert a claim of
unfair discrimination under Section 9, plaintiffs need only allege two
elements. First, plaintiffs must allege that a government decision dis-
criminates on prohibited grounds, either a ground that is specified in the
statute (for example, race or colour) or an unspecified ground.22 - Second,
plaintiffs must allege that such discrimination is unfair, that is, that it ad-
versely affects certain groups of people in a way that significantly
diminishes their dignity.
2 23
Hypothetical plaintiffs could argue that fees constitute discrimina-
tion on the prohibited grounds of race, class, or both. South African law
supports these types of linkages. In earlier decisions, the South African
Constitutional Court has held that discrimination on the basis of geo-
graphical residence may constitute racial discrimination where
geographical patterns of residence are strongly correlated to race.
2 4
218. See President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo, 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC); see
also THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK (De Waal et al. eds., 4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter BILL
OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK].
219. See Hugo, supra note 218, at 66-67.
220. S.AFR. CONST. ch. II, 5 9.
221. In Pretoria City Council v. Walker, 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC), the South African
Constitutional Court explicitly decided that plaintiffi need not allege intent to discrimi-
nate in order to bring an unfair discrimination claim under 5 9(3) of the South African
Constitution. See id. at para. 43-44. To be sure, the Walker court also held that the intent
to discriminate was relevant in assessing the nature and purpose of government conduct,
but the court found that intent was not dispositive. Id.
222. See BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 218.
223. See id.
224. In Walker, the Constitutional Court found that geographical differentiation that
corresponded to former segregation patterns constituted indirect discrimination on the
basis of race. 1998 (2) SA 363. In particular, the Court found that the Pretoria City
Council had discriminated on the basis of race when it charged flat utility rates to two
townships, but charged metered rates to residents of Old Pretoria.
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Likewise, plaintiffs in a school fees case can point to research that
demonstrates a very strong correlation between race, attendance at for-
merly racially categorized school, and fee-based expenditures per learner.
For example, in a recent study conducted in the Eastern Cape, research-
ers found that seventy-nine percent of South African students remained
in formerly Black schools, ninety-four percent of Coloured students re-
mained in so-called Coloured schools, and 100% of White students
remained in formerly White schools.225 Predictably, fees charged at differ-
ent schools were strongly correlated to the former racial status of each
school. Black schools charged an average of R45 per year per learner,
Coloured schools charged R99, and White schools charged R2077, over
forty-five times the rate of Black schools.226 Moreover, this research con-
firms that expenditures per learner vary significantly according to the fees
charged, the racial composition of the school, and its former racial classi-
fication.
Plaintiffs would have a fairly strong argument with regard to the
second element as well, which requires that they prove the discrimina-
tion is unfair. Under South African equality law, government practices
that create racial disparities are presumed to be unfair, regardless of
whether such disparities were intended.2 2 ' This presumption requires the
Court to consider the discrimination in historical context, to situate the
alleged violation in the country's social history, and to calculate the de-
gree of injury to individual dignity.2 8
In past cases, the South African Constitutional Court has, therefore,
looked to three factors to assess whether discrimination is unfair: (i) the
position of complainants in society and whether they have suffered in the
past from patterns of disadvantage; (ii) the nature of the provision of
power and the purpose sought to be achieved by it; and (iii) the extent
to which the discrimination complained of impairs the complainants'
fundamental human dignity or other human interest. 9
In the case of school fees, plaintiffs can make a strong case that
school fees are unfairly discriminatory under these three factors. In terms
The effect of apartheid laws was that race and geography were inextricably linked
and the application of a geographical standard, although seemingly neutral, may be in fact
racially discriminatory. In this case, its impact was clearly one that differentiated in sub-
stance between Black residents and White residents. The fact that there may have been a
few Black residents in old Pretoria does not detract from this. Id.
Similarly, the relationship between race and the income of families attending a
school, and the corresponding ability of a school to charge fees, would be sufficient to
mount a Section 9 challenge.
225. Financing Schools, supra note 12, at 19, tbl. 5.
226. See id.
227. See S. AFR. CONST. § 9(5) (discrimination based on a listed ground, including
race, is presumed to be unfair unless proved otherwise by defendants).
228. See id.
229. See BILL OF RIGHTs HANDBOOK, supra note 218.
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of the first and third factors, plaintiffs' position in society and the degree
to which their dignity is reduced, plaintiffs would stand on solid ground.
As discussed earlier, current disparities in educational expenditure appear
to reproduce almost exactly the racial differences of the old apartheid
system. Indeed, in light of available research, the user fee system appears
merely to recreate the pre-apartheid Bantu education system in another
form, because the ability of each school to charge fees and to spend
money on each learner correlates very strongly to racial identity.230
Thus, in both the Bantu system and the school fee system, Whites
receive the highest expenditures per learner in public education,
followed by Coloureds, Indians and then, at the far end of the spectrum,
Black Africans. The South African user fee system almost exactly
reproduces the racial stratification of access to quality education that
characterized the apartheid-era school system. In terms of the second
factor-the nature and purpose of the government provision at issue-
government can offer some arguments to justify school fees, as is more
fully discussed in the next section on the Limitations Clause.
2. Limitations Clause: Justifications to Charge School Fees
Plaintiffs might have a slightly more difficult time countering the
argument that school fees are reasonable and justifiable despite their dis-
criminatory effect. In the second stage of constitutional analysis, a court
must assess under Section 36 (the Limitations Clause) whether presuma-
bly unfair conduct is nevertheless rendered fair because it serves some
important government interest. 23' More specifically, the court must de-
termine whether practices that are presumed unfair are "reasonable and
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity,
equality and freedom. ,
232
Under Section 36, the government likely will attempt to justify the
user fee system as reasonable and justifiable on three grounds. First, the
government could argue that it must charge school fees in order to avoid
either a significant budgetary increase or White flight and the potential
collapse of public education as a whole. As noted earlier, most commen-
tators agree that equalizing expenditures per learner across racial
categories would have required the government to increase government
expenditures significantly, something that the government has been un-
willing to contemplate given the current emphasis on fiscal austerity."'
According to a report to Parliament in 1996, the Department of Educa-
tion had concluded that, "the education budget, for the foreseeable
230. See Financing Schools, supra note 12.
231. See S.AR. CONST. § 36.
232. Id.
233. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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future, [would] in no way be in a position to fund all schools at the level
of the historically most costly. Any equitable distribution of public funds
[would], therefore, [have] result[ed] in a sharp decline in the allocations
of the historically better funded parts of the system. '234 Thus, the gov-
ernment might argue that school fees are necessary to avoid such sharp
declines, the potential defection of middle and upper-income families,
and the potential collapse of public education as a whole.
Second, the government could argue that it relies on fees in order
to redistribute funds to the poor, by permitting the state to redirect funds
away from wealthier families and towards poor learners. In a recently
released report on school financing, the Department of Education em-
phasized that the government had designed the school fee policy to
permit the targeting of needy learners with money the government had
saved by collecting from private sources instead of national or provincial
coffers.23 ' Third, the government might argue that school fees promote
civic participation, local control, and the accountability of public educa-
tion to its constituency. The Department of Education's report on school
financing argued that in addition to providing financial benefits to learn-
ers, school fees were desirable because they promoted community
participation and civic accountability.236
By no means is it clear whether the Constitutional Court would
decide that these competing interests justify the racially disproportionate
impact of school fees. In many ways, the Limitations Clause analysis
under Section 36 resembles the U.S. Supreme Court's constitutional
balancing in cases where strict scrutiny is invoked. Both constitutional
courts must weigh the value of the right to equal protection against
competing governmental interests, to see whether governmental action
that limits the right to equal protection might nevertheless be consistent
with the country's vision of a constitutional order.
Whether or not the Constitutional Court finds that such limitations
are justifiable, however, plaintiffs can make out a prima facie claim with-
out having to allege intentional discrimination. In contrast, allegations
about intent are absolutely central under U.S. law, as the next section
discusses.
234. See Memorandum from S. Aft. Department of Education to Portfolio Commit-
tee on Education and Council of Education Ministers on Draft School Finance Policy,
February 26, 1996 at 8 (on file with author).
235. See id.
236. See id. In some U.S. cases, courts have held that school financing schemes that
relied on local property taxes for funding also promoted local control. See, e.g., San Anto-
nio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,49 (1973).
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B. U.S. Equal Protection Law
Under traditional equal protection analysis, it is far less certain that a
court applying U.S. law would strike down South African school fees as
unconstitutional. In assessing school fees under U.S. law, courts would
apply strict scrutiny to determine whether government school fees were
constitutional. Under strict scrutiny, a court would conduct a two-step
analysis, to determine (i) whether the governmental action at issue dis-
criminates against a suspect class or creates disparities with regard to a
fundamental right; and (ii) whether the government can assert a compel-
ling governmental interest for doing so.23
With regard to the first element, the U.S. Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Washington v. Davi 38 held that only intentional discrimination
violates constitutional equal protection law.239 In Davis, the Court upheld
the constitutionality of a literacy test administered to police officers.24
The Court explicitly rejected the notion that plaintiffs could make out a
prima facie constitutional violation merely by demonstrating evidence of
racial disparities in employment populations.241 The Court held that be-
cause plaintiffs could not allege that the police department intended to
exclude minority applicants by using selection tests, the literacy test did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause.242 This was true despite the fact
that the test excluded significantly more Black applicants than White
ones.243
Given the racial composition and political commitments of the new
democratic government in South Africa, it would be difficult to allege
that the South African government intended to discriminate when it
237. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
238. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
239. See id. In Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), the Supreme Court modified its
assessment of what constitutes intent to discriminate when evaluating a facially neutral
government act. In an earlier era, the Court had demanded plaintiffs provide evidence of
animus, that is, intent to harm a particular racial group. See Personnel Administrator v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). More recently, after the Court's decision in Shaw, it is
enough if plaintiffs show that the government intended to create a racial classification,
whether or not it intended to adversely affect a particular racial group. In either event, it
remains constitutional to retain a program that disproportionately excludes people of
color if the program is retained by a new government because it is too expensive to
switch to a more egalitarian program. See id.
240. 426 U.S. 229.
241. Id. at 239 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's protections were not co-
extensive with those ofTitleVII).
242. Similarly, the Court recently determined that federal statutes prohibiting dis-
crimination in federally covered programs (like public education) do not prohibit
unintentional discriminatory conduct. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275
(2001).
243. 426 U.S. at 235.
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decided to adopt user fees.244 As this Article has argued, the government
chose to continue to charge fees, not because of any animus against
Blacks, but in order to avoid switching costs, including the potential
collapse of the public education system.
In the absence of any evidence indicating an intent to discriminate,
courts applying U.S. law likely would dismiss any claim that the South
African government violated equal protection law. Indeed, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has already once rejected an explicit equal protection
challenge to school financing mechanisms that create inequalities in ex-
penditures per learner. In San Antonio v. Rodriguez,24 s the Supreme Court
upheld as constitutional the practice of financing public schools through
local property taxes that varied quite significantly with the wealth of the
district, even though there was evidence of significant inequality in edu-
cational opportunity across the state.246 Courts would also likely dismiss a
challenge to fees under U.S. Law.
C. Comparing U.S. and South African Law
Through the Lens of Lock-In
Viewing U.S. and South African equality law through the lens of
the lock-in model yields two important insights. First, and most impor-
tantly, South African law is far more able to address "unintentional"
locked-in discrimination than is U.S. law. Of course, the South African
Constitutional Court likely will consider whether discrimination is in-
tentional in assessing whether such discrimination is unfair. But the
intentional nature of discrimination is at best a peripheral and related
consideration in South African legal analysis. Under the South African
Equality Clause, the analysis centers on whether government conduct
that creates racial disparities can be justified as consistent with the new
constitutional order and its emphasis on equality and dignity.
In comparison, U.S. equal protection law, with its focus on
intentional discrimination, is poorly equipped to address discrimination
of the sort exemplified by school fees. Because U.S. law targets an
individual or institution that intends to discriminate, the law cannot
244. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing politics of Black-majority
government).
245. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
246. See id. In Rodriguez, the Court declined to subject the property-tax system to
strict constitutional scrutiny for two reasons. First, the Court found that plaintiffs had not
sufficiently alleged discrimination against a well-defined and recognized suspect class and
that wealth did not constitute a suspect class. Id. at 28-29. Second, the Court held that,
because education was not a fundamental right, plaintiffs' allegation of discrimination in
education triggered only rational basis, not strict scrutiny, review. Id. at 37-39. Under the
more lenient rational basis test, the Court found that the state's interest in local control
over education sufficiently justified existing inequalities. Id. at 54-55.
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address an institution that continues to engage in once intentionally
discriminatory practices for currently non-discriminatory reasons.
Second, both U.S. constitutional law and South African law poten-
tially can accommodate the argument relating to high switching costs.
Under both versions of equality law, the government can argue that
charging fees is "reasonable and justifiable" (or serves a "compelling"
interest) because doing so avoids a significant budgetary increase and
economic injury, or alternatively avoids White flight and the collapse of
the system.
Although South African courts are directed to read the right to
equality against the backdrop of the legacy of apartheid, they still might
find that the right to equality can justifiably be limited because of
prohibitive switching costs. Similarly, U.S. courts might justify the
discriminatory impact of fees by finding that such fees serve a compelling
government interest by preserving the health of public education.
Ultimately, both courts would have to assess the societal "switching"
costs associated with moving from a discriminatory policy to a more
egalitarian one.
CONCLUSION
Building on the foundation of earlier work, this Article focuses on
three important points about the lock-in model of discrimination. First,
switching costs can play a very significant role in explaining why dis-
crimination persists even in the absence of intent. To be sure, given the
racial composition of the ANC-led government, even critics of the
South African government would find it difficult to argue that the gov-
ernment intended to discriminate by relying on school fees. If switching
costs can induce even a Black-majority government to engage in prac-
tices that reproduce the racial disparities of the apartheid regime, then
such costs are even more likely to play a role in the predominantly
White U.S. government.
For that reason, the notion of switching costs may help rhetorically
to reframe the discrimination debate in more useful terms. Opponents
are more likely to find common ground if they can agree that well-
meaning policymakers might nevertheless continue to discriminate for
non-discriminatory (and perhaps laudable) reasons-to avoid budget in-
creases or preserve the public education system, for example. Explaining
how discrimination becomes locked-in via switching costs is less likely to
elicit the sort of emotional response that often accompanies allegations of
intentional racism. In addition, the task of identifying and reducing those
switching costs that impede a move towards equality might prove far
more useful than merely identifying bad intentional actors.
Second, and relatedly, the lock-in model explains in concrete terms
why focusing exclusively on intentional discrimination may not be
[VOL. 9:31
Locked in Inequality
enough to eradicate racial disparities. Critical Race Theorists have long
argued that the focus of U.S. law on intentional discrimination is too
narrow to address persistent structural racism. 27 Although these writers
have tapped into a widely-shared intuitive belief about the inadequacies
of an intentionalist model, the lock-in model provides a more concrete
story about why the U.S. intentionalist approach is deficient.
In particular, the lock-in model demonstrates that even in the ab-
sence of intent to discriminate, discrimination persists because of
institutional history and structural relationships. Historical events like
apartheid and segregation chart an early course of discriminatory practices
in institutions. These practices become self-reinforcing over time because
institutions are structured around such practices. As a result, institutions
find the costs associated with switching to non-discriminatory practices
too high to pay. Having taken the discriminatory fork in the road earlier
on, institutional actors find it too difficult to attempt to chart a different
path.
To be sure, this Article's focus on locked-in discrimination at the
institutional level should not be interpreted to mean that intentional dis-
crimination is no longer an issue. It may be true that the ANC's decision
to rely on school fees was really an intentional decision to pay less atten-
tion to the needs of poor Black learners, in order to pursue a strategy of
growing the Black middle class. But this Article proposes that for any
society trying to negotiate a relatively recent transition to equity and
anti-discrimination, the lock-in model and the concept of switching costs
may help to explain why racial disparities might persist over time even in
an ideal world where intentional discrimination has been eliminated. 48
247. See, e.g., Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrini-
nation Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1052-53
(1978) (presenting one of the earliest and best formulations of this argument).
248. See Richard Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in LegalAnalysis, 107
Htav. L. REv. 1841 (1994) (arguing that even in a hypothetical world without intentional
discrimination, segregated patterns of housing would persist because of a self-reinforcing
relationship between neighborhood and income).
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